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Do the distributional consequences of monetary policy depend on the extent of
ﬁnancial development? Should optimal monetary policy vary across countries? In
order to answer these questions, we develop a monetary growth production model
with heterogeneous agents. In our economy, optimal policy needs to weigh the eﬀects
of policy across two groups — capital owners and individuals who hold liquid assets.
While banks help limit the exposure to inﬂation, there are limits because money
alleviates the frictions of private information and limited communication. In this
environment, we compare two economies thata r ei d e n t i c a li ne v e r ya s p e c te x c e p tf o r
their level of ﬁnancial development. In a country with limited ﬁnancial development,
a stock market is absent. In the other, an equity market is active.
In either economy, inﬂation adversely aﬀects capital formation and output. In-
dividuals who hold liquid assets are always adversely aﬀected by inﬂation, but the
attitude of capital owners depends on the level of ﬁnancial development. In par-
ticular, in the presence of a stock market, the impact of inﬂation on the welfare of
capital owners is non-monotonic. Nevertheless, optimal monetary policy is always
more conservative at higher levels of ﬁnancial development.
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11 Introduction
Inﬂation varies signiﬁcantly across countries. The distribution of income also varies across
countries. In particular, average inﬂation rates tend to be higher in less developed coun-
tries compared to those in advanced countries. For example, data from the International
Monetary Fund indicates that the average annual inﬂation rate in industrialized coun-
tries between 1969 and 2008 was 5.1% compared to 24.1% in developing countries.1 In
terms of income inequality, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) stress that ﬁnancial devel-
opment is likely to generate further income inequality. Monetary policy also plays a role —
Romer and Romer (1998) contend that income inequality is exacerbated at high inﬂation
rates. Moreover, previous studies attribute high inﬂation rates in less developed countries
to repressive measures by policymakers. For instance, Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995)
demonstrate that seigniorage taxation can be welfare improving when tax evasion is high.2
Do the distributional consequences of monetary policy depend on the extent of ﬁnancial
development? Should optimal monetary policy vary across countries? In this manuscript,
we study the eﬀects of monetary policy in economies with heterogeneous agents — capital
owners and individuals who hold liquid assets. In particular, we seek to provide an
explanation for variations in the stance of monetary policy across countries based on the
extent of ﬁnancial development. In fact, we demonstrate that inﬂation should be higher
in economies where the ﬁnancial sector is less developed. Notably, under-development is
a primary characteristic of the ﬁnancial sector in low income countries.3
We proceed by outlining the details of our modeling framework. We consider a two-
period overlapping generations production economy inhabited by two types of agents:
depositors and entrepreneurs. Following Townsend (1987), depositors are born on one
of two geographically separated, yet symmetric locations. After portfolios are made, a
group of depositors is randomly chosen to relocate to the other location. In the event
of relocation, private information and limited communication require that individuals
trade using money. Financial intermediaries are able to insure depositors against random
relocation shocks. By comparison to depositors, entrepreneurs have the ability to invest
in capital goods when young. Finally, there is a government that adjusts the bonds to
money ratio in order to achieve an exogenous inﬂation target.
In order to study the interaction between monetary policy and the stages of ﬁnancial
development, we compare two economies that are identical in every aspect except for their
level of ﬁnancial development. In one economy (benchmark case), the ﬁnancial sector is
less developed as a stock market permitting specialized capital goods to be traded over
time is not operative. In the other economy, an equity market is active.
A sab e n c h m a r k ,w ea s s u m et h a tﬁnancial market frictions prevent entrepreneurs from
trading capital goods in secondary markets. Given that capital investment is completely
irreversible, it is also completely sunk. Under a technical condition, a stationary equi-
librium exists and is unique. Higher inﬂation rates fuel inﬂation-ﬁnanced government
debt to the beneﬁt of entrepreneurs — the crowding-out eﬀect generates higher returns to
capital. However, higher inﬂation rates hurt depositors who are exposed to liquidity risk.
In this manner, inﬂation is a major source of income inequality in the under-developed
economy. Notably, the ability of the government to collect seigniorage revenues declines
1While many countries succeeded to tame inﬂation by pursuing an inﬂation targeting regime and
solving ﬁscal problems, signiﬁcant diﬀerences remain. For instance, in 2011 average inﬂa t i o ni na d v a n c e d
countries was 2.7% compared to 7% in developing countries.
2Bencivenga and Smith (1992) reach a similar conclusion.
3There is a large body of evidence that highlights the role of ﬁnancial sector deveopment for economic
growth and development. Among previous studies we cite, King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zer-
vos (1998), Levine (1997) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996) and
Rousseau and Wachtel (2000), and Shen and Lee (2006).
2with the rate of money creation since money demand in the economy responds to the
inﬂation rate. Optimal monetary policy balances the gains to capital owners versus those
exposed to liquidity risk.4 If entrepreneurs have a slightly higher weight than the welfare
of depositors, the Friedman Rule is not optimal.5
We proceed to study the behavior of an economy where entrepreneurs are capable of
trading specialized capital goods in secondary markets. Since the stock market provides
an opportunity for old entrepreneurs to sell their capital to the younger generation, equity
markets raise the return to capital investment, which in turn stimulates capital formation.
Driven by higher wages, the welfare of entrepreneurs and depositors is higher at higher
stages of ﬁnancial development. In this manner, the stock market leads to a Pareto supe-
rior allocation of resources. However, as the income of capital owners increases more than
others, ﬁnancial development as described by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) generates
further income inequality. Moreover, because inﬂation distorts capital accumulation, in-
ﬂation limits the gains from ﬁnancial development. In particular, the marginal eﬀects of
inﬂation on the level of activity are much more pronounced in the stock market economy.
Furthermore, in contrast to the benchmark economy, the attitude of capital owners
towards inﬂation is non-monotonic in the presence of a stock market. At low levels of
inﬂation, inﬂation adversely aﬀects the welfare of entrepreneurs. Advances of the inﬂation
target from a low rate lower the resale value of capital because future generations do not
have as much income. It is this channel that is distinct from the eﬀects of monetary
policy in the benchmark model. Though the Friedman Rule may not be optimal, the
optimal inﬂation target is lower at high stages of ﬁnancial development. This suggests
that monetary policy should be designed according to the stages of ﬁnancial development.
The results in this manuscript are consistent with empirical evidence that ﬁnds a
negative correlation between inﬂation and the real economy. For example, Boyd, Levine,
and Smith (2001) ﬁnd that higher inﬂation is associated with lower levels of lending and
bank deposits.6 Moreover, the authors ﬁnd an inverse relationship between inﬂation and
the volume of trade in the stock market. More importantly, the eﬀects of inﬂation are
non-linear. Speciﬁcally, the eﬀects are decreasing with the level of inﬂation.
Furthermore, as discussed above, a large amount of literature highlights that the ﬁ-
nancial sector plays an important role in economic development. More recent work by
Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) suggest that the eﬀects of ﬁnancial development on economic
activity depend on monetary policy. In particular, when inﬂation exceeds a threshold level,
ﬁnancial development ceases to increase economic growth.
4As in standard overlapping generations models with money, the Golden rule is used as the welfare
criterion. That is, the inﬂation rate is chosen by the monetary authority to maximize the ex-ante steady-
state weighted welfare of all agents in the economy. Previous studies that follow a similar approach
include Weiss (1980), Freeman (1993), Bhattacharya et al. (1997), and Edmond (2002).
5Focusing on the eﬀects of inﬂation on income inequality, Albanesi (2007) examines an environment
where agents diﬀer by their labor productivity. Households can purchase goods using cash or credit (a
costly transactions technology). Agents with high labor productivity gain more from the transactions
technology as they have higher consumption levels. In this manner, poor agents rely more on cash, while
rich households use more credit to fund their consumption. Therefore, the poor are more exposed to
inﬂation relative to rich agents. In contrast to our work, the stance of monetary policy is determined
in a political bargaining game between diﬀerent income groups. Since the poor are more vulnerable to
inﬂation, their bargaining power is weak, and the rich succeed in implementing high inﬂation.
Although we do not attempt to endogenize the weight assigned to the expected utility of each group of
agents as in Albanesi (2007), similar insights can be generated in our environment. In particular, given
that entrepreneurs do not hold money (as they are not subject to relocation shocks), they enjoy a much
higher income when inﬂation is positive compared to depositors. Moreover, depositors are more exposed
to inﬂation than entrepreneurs. In this manner, as in Albanesi (2007), entrepreneurs might enjoy more
bargaining power if they were to enter a political bargaining game with depositors. Consequently, optimal
monetary policy would always deviate from the Friedman rule.
6Other work includes De Gregorio (1992, 1993), Fischer (1993), Haslag and Koo (1999), and Bae and
Ratti (2000).
3Related Literature
This paper contributes to a growing literature that studies the eﬀects of monetary pol-
icy on economic activity across countries. Available time-series evidence such as Ahmed
and Rogers (2001) and Bullard and Keating (1995) suggests that inﬂation may be posi-
tively correlated with output in low inﬂation countries such as the United States. Other
work addressing the impact of monetary policy across countries is cross-sectional. Fischer
(1993) and Barro (1995) ﬁnd that inﬂation is negatively related to the growth rate of
output across countries. Ghosh and Phillips (1998) and Khan and Senhadji (2001) ﬁnd
evidence of threshold eﬀects of inﬂation — the eﬀects of inﬂation have little eﬀect at low
inﬂation rates, but it does impair growth beyond a threshold (which could be as low as
10%).
Several recent papers attempt to explain why the eﬀects of monetary policy vary across
countries. On the basis of the time-series evidence, Ghossoub and Reed (2010) discuss how
individuals in poor countries are more susceptible to liquidity risk, forcing agents to hold
more liquid assets as a result. Since the degree of liquidity risk varies across countries,
the eﬀects of monetary policy also vary. Ghossoub and Reed (2012) develop a neoclassical
growth model with a cash-in-advance constraint where the reliance on cash is inversely
related to the level of economic development. In rich countries with little reliance on cash
as a medium of exchange, a Tobin-eﬀect prevails. In poor countries, a reverse-Tobin eﬀect
occurs.
This paper follows directly from Ghossoub and Reed (2013) who argue that the trans-
mission channels vary across countries due to the availability of equity markets. In poor
countries without stock markets, a reverse-Tobin eﬀect occurs but the presence of a stock
market may lead to a Tobin eﬀect. However, in Ghossoub and Reed (2013), the authors
primarily study the eﬀects of open market operations in which the economy’s inﬂation rate
is an endogenous variable, responding to the exogenous gross liabilities of the government
across the levels of development. By comparison, we study the eﬀects of inﬂation target-
ing so that the liabilities of the government respond to the economy’s money growth rule.
Moreover, this paper is primarily concern e dw i t ht h ew e l f a r ec o n s e q u e n c e so fﬁnancial
development and the formation of optimal monetary policy across the stages of economic
development. While it is hard to interpret the optimal bonds-money ratio in a model of
open market operations, an economy’s optimal money growth rule is easily understood.
In this paper, the transmission channels of policy also vary depending on the avail-
ability of equity markets. With an eye towards the available cross-sectional evidence that
generally ﬁnds that inﬂation is negatively related to economic activity, regardless of the
level of development, we seek to understand why advanced countries systematically have
lower inﬂation rates than poor countries.
Our work also contributes to a growing literature on optimal monetary policy in the
presence of heterogeneity.7 Notably, the bulk of previous studies focused on the redis-
tributional eﬀects of inﬂation resulting from diﬀerent levels of money holdings across
agents.8 For example, in a recent study by Bhattacharya et al. (2008), agents diﬀer by
their marginal utilities from real money balances. Therefore, some agents hold little cash,
while others hold a large amount of cash in equilibrium. In an inﬂationary environment,
the contribution of each group of agents to total seigniorage depends on their level of
7Previous work includes Freeman (1985), Edmond (2002), Erosa and Ventura (2002), Ireland (2005),
Doepke and Schneider (2006), and Albanesi (2007)
8For instance, Erosa and Ventura (2002) introduce heterogeneity in transaction patterns and portfolio
holdings across individuals. They ﬁnd that the burden of inﬂation is substantially higher for individuals
at the bottom of the income distribution than for those at the top. By comparison in Albanesi (2007)
agents are either rich or poor. Households’ level of income aﬀects their choice between cash and other
costly ﬁnancial arrangements.
4money holdings. In comparison to our framework, the monetary authority rebates back
all seigniorage income in equal lump sum transfers. Consequently, an inﬂationary policy
redistributes wealth from those who hold too much cash to those who hold little cash. In
this manner, the Friedman rule does not maximize type-speciﬁc welfare. Moreover, it is
possible for the redistributive eﬀect of an increase in the money growth rate to dominate
the rate-of-return eﬀect for some types of agents.
As in previous studies, we demonstrate that the Friedman rule may not be optimal
when heterogeneity is considered. However, we also show that the attitude of diﬀerent
groups towards inﬂation may signiﬁcantly vary with the level of ﬁnancial development.
More importantly, optimal policy depends on the provisions of ﬁnancial services in the
economy. Speciﬁcally, it is optimal to set higher inﬂation rates in economies with a poorly
developed ﬁnancial system.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment in the bench-
mark model and studies the eﬀects of monetary policy. Section 3 studies the implications
ﬁnancial development for diﬀerent economic outcomes and monetary policy. Finally, we
conclude in Section 4. Most of the technical details are presented in the Appendix.
2 The Benchmark Model
In order to highlight the importance of ﬁnancial development for monetary policy, we
study a modiﬁed Diamond (1965) production economy. As in Townsend (1987), spatial
separation and informational constraints generate a role for money. However, unlike
standard neoclassical models, we consider that physical capital is completely specialized
and irreversible. Such frictions in the market for inputs provide a role for the stock
market in our environment. As a benchmark, we assume that there are no equity markets
for trading undepreciated heterogenous capital goods. This approach follows Magill and
Quinzii (2003) and Ghossoub and Reed (2013).
2.1 The Environment in the Benchmark Economy
We consider a discrete-time economy with two geographically separated, yet symmetric
locations. Let t =1 ,2,..∞ , index time. At each location, there is an inﬁnite sequence of
two-period lived overlapping generations plus an initial group of old individuals. In each
generation, there are two types of agents: ex-ante identical depositors and entrepreneurs
indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. At the beginning of each period t>0, a continuum of young agents
is born. The population of each group of agents is equal to one.
Depositors and entrepreneurs are assumed to derive utility from consuming the single
perishable good in old-age. Let ct represent consumption per person in period t.T h e
lifetime utility of an agent is given by u(ct)=l n ct.9 Moreover, each young agent is
endowed with one unit of labor, which she supplies inelastically.
While depositors are identical ex-ante, entrepreneurs diﬀer by their ability to run spe-
ciﬁc production technologies. In particular an entrepreneur of type j will be able to run
a constant returns to scale production technology j when old. Unlike previous work by











t). During the production
process, only a fraction δ ∈ [0,1] of the capital stock breaks down. Furthermore, we
assume that Fj is increasing in each argument, quasiconcave, twice continuously diﬀer-
entiable, and satisﬁes standard Inada conditions. As we discuss below, entrepreneurs are
9The primary insights in this paper can be obtained under general CRRA preferences, with a coeﬃcient
of risk aversion greater than one.
5the sole holders of physical capital. Therefore, we denote the utilization of each factor























When young, entrepreneurs have access to a linear production technology that converts
goods into capital. In particular, one unit of investment by a young entrepreneur j in
period t becomes one unit of capital of type j next period. Capital is also assumed to be
completely irreversible. That is, agents cannot convert matured capital goods back into
the consumption good. As discussed in Pindyck (1988), irreversibility is a by-product
of the specialized nature of capital employed in speciﬁc production technologies. In this
environment, unless there is a mechanism (market) that enables specialized capital goods
to be traded, investment is completely sunk.
There are three types of assets in this economy: ﬁat money, government bonds, and
capital. Denote the total amount of nominal money balances and government debt by
Mt and Bt, respectively. At the initial date 0, the generation of type j entrepreneurs at
each location is endowed with the aggregate stock K
j
0. In addition, for reasons discussed
below, old depositors are endowed with the initial aggregate money stock, M0 > 0.
Let Pt ∈ (0,∞) denote the price of a unit of goods in units of currency at time t,w h i c h
is common across locations. Thus, in real terms, the supply of money and government
bonds is mt = Mt/Pt and bt = Bt/Pt, respectively. Moreover, the return to money
between period t and t +1is Pt
Pt+1. Furthermore, a government security held in period
t yields It units of currency in period t +1 . Equivalently, the gross real interest on
government debt in period t +1is Rt = It
Pt
Pt+1.
Following Townsend (1987) and Schreft and Smith (1997), depositors are subject to
random relocation shocks. With some probability, π, a depositor has to relocate to the
other location. The probability of relocation, is exogenous, publicly known and is the
same across locations. Moreover, the realization of the shock takes place after all markets
close. Assuming the law of large numbers holds, π also reﬂects the number of relocated
depositors. Due to limited communication and private information, agents cannot trade
claims to assets they own on the other location. As in standard random relocation models,
ﬁat money is the only asset that can be carried across locations.10,11 Furthermore, ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries arise endogenously in this environment to insure depositors against
idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, all savings of depositors are intermediated. By comparison
to depositors, entrepreneurs are not subject to relocation shocks. Therefore, they do not
allocate funds into banking accounts.
The ﬁnal agent in the economy is a government that adjusts the amount of new
liabilities in order to ﬁnance interest payments on previously issued debt. It also obtains






We assume that the monetary authority implements an inﬂation targeting regime. Specif-
ically, the central bank conducts open market operations by adjusting the bonds to cur-
rency ratio, μt ≡ bt
mt to achieve a particular inﬂation target, σ =
Pt+1
Pt . The approach of
conducting open market operations through changing the composition of government lia-
bilities was introduced by Wallace (1984). Throughout the analysis, we focus on equilibria
10That is, government debt is not as liquid as cash to be carried costlessly to the other location. This
restriction on asset portability is standard in random relocation models.
11Random relocation shocks play a similar role to liquidity preference shocks in Diamond and Dybvig
(1983).
6where inﬂation is non-negative, σ>1.12
2.2 Trade
2.2.1 A Typical Entrepreneur’s Problem
At the beginning of period t, a young entrepreneur works and earns the wage rate wt,w h i c h
is entirely saved. The savings’ portfolio of a typical entrepreneur consists of investment
in new capital, i
j
t and government bonds, be






As entrepreneurs cannot trade undepreciated capital, the capital stock in period t +1is






Consequently, an entrepreneur has k
j
t+1 units of capital in period t +1that is combined
along with labor, l
j
t+1, to produce the economy’s homogeneous consumption good. Thus,











Although each entrepreneur possesses knowledge of a particular type of production
technique j, the utility maximization problem for each is symmetric. Consequently, we
suppress the superscript j throughout the remaining analysis. Instead, we denote the
consumption level of a representative entrepreneur in period t +1as ce
t+1. Therefore, a





subject to the resource constraints (2)-(4). Substituting the constraints into the objective
function, the problem may be expressed as:
Max
it,lt+1
ln[f(it,l t+1) − wt+1lt+1 +( wt − it)Rt] (6)
Since factor markets are perfectly competitive, labor and capital earn their marginal
products. By constant returns to scale, real wages are:
wt+1 =
[f(kt+1,l t+1) − kt+1f1 (kt+1,l t+1)]
lt+1
(7)
where f1 (kt+1,l t+1)=
∂f(kt+1,lt+1)
∂kt+1 . From an entrepreneur’s perspective, physical capital
and government debt are perfect substitutes. Therefore, both assets are held in equi-
librium up to the point where they yield the same rate of return. This leads to the
no-arbitrage condition:
f1 (kt+1,l t+1)=Rt (8)
Finally, using (2) − (5), (7),a n d(8), the maximized welfare of a typical entrepreneur
is such that:
ue
t+1 =l nf1 (kt+1,l t+1)wt (9)
12We relax this assumption when conducting welfare analysis.
72.2.2 A Representative Bank’s Problem
Analogous to entrepreneurs, a young depositor works and earns the market wage rate,
wt. Exploiting the law of large numbers implies that there is no aggregate risk and
banks are able to insure their depositors against idiosyncratic risk. Given that ﬁnancial
intermediation is costless, banks are able to oﬀer deposit contracts that dominate any
direct investment by an individual depositor. Therefore, risk averse depositors choose to
intermediate all their savings.
In this environment, banks are Nash competitors. That is, each bank promises a
gross real return rm
t if a young individual will be relocated and a gross real return rn
t if
not, taking the real return oﬀered by other banks as given. As the market for deposits
is perfectly competitive, banks earn zero proﬁts and choose portfolios to maximize the
expected utility of each depositor.
Announced deposit returns must satisfy the following constraints. First, deposits
received by a bank are allocated towards real money balances, mt, and government debt,
bd
t.13 Therefore, the following balance sheet condition must hold:
mt + bd
t = wt (10)
Second, the bank needs to hold enough cash reserves to meet the anticipated demand for
liquidity by movers in t +1 :
πrm




In addition, we choose to study equilibria in which money is dominated in rate of return
(i.e., Pt
Pt+1 <R t). Therefore, banks will not carry money balances between periods t and
t +1 . The bank’s total payments to non-movers are therefore paid out of its returns on
government bonds in t +1 :
(1 − π)rn
t wt = Rtbd
t (12)
Thus, each bank chooses values of rm
t ,rn
t ,m t,a n dbd






t wt +( 1− π)lnrn
t wt (13)
subject to (10) - (12). The solution yields the bank’s money demand function:
mt = πwt (14)
Because depositors have logarithmic preferences, banks allocate a constant fraction of
their deposits towards money balances.









which indicates that depositors receive a lower amount of insurance when government
bonds pay a relatively higher rate of return. Finally, using (10) − (14), the maximized
expected utility of a typical depositor is expressed by:
ud
t = π ln
Pt
Pt+1
wt +( 1− π)lnRtwt (16)
13As the total number of depositors is unity, mt and bd
t reﬂect the amount of real cash and government
debt per depositor as well as their aggregate levels for this particular group of agents.
82.3 General Equilibrium
We now combine the results of the preceding section and characterize the equilibrium for
the benchmark economy. In equilibrium, labor eﬀort receives its marginal product (7).




From the bank’s balance sheet, (10) and entrepreneurs’ budget constraint, (2),w ec a n
obtain the total demand for government bonds, with bD
t = be
t+bd
t. Using the expression for
the bonds to reserves ratio, μt, the total supply of bonds can be expressed as bS
t = μtmt.
By clearing the bond market, we obtain the law of motion of capital:
kt+1 =[ 2− (1 + μt)π]w(kt) (18)
In addition, the demand for capital goods by entrepreneurs is expressed by (8).
Finally, imposing equilibrium on the money market by using the expression for money
demand, (14) along with the debt to reserves policy and the no-arbitrage condition, (8)











Conditions (8), (18),a n d(19) characterize the behavior of the economy at each point in
time.
In this manuscript, we focus primarily on the stationary behavior of the economy. We
proceed to study the steady equilibrium in the following section.
2.3.1 Steady-State Analysis






which indicates that for all σ>1, μ>(<)0when R>(<)0. That is, the government
is a net borrower (lender) in ﬁnancial markets when real interest rates are positive (neg-
ative). Furthermore, the degree of liquidity is a decreasing function in R. For instance,
when R>1, a higher real interest rate on government bonds raises the government’s
payment obligations. However, the inﬂation tax rate is ﬁxed at rate σ.T h i sp r e v e n t st h e
government from generating the additional seigniorage revenue that is required to satisfy
its budget constraint. Consequently, the government must lower its obligations by issuing
less debt.
Furthermore, incorporating (20) into (8) and (18), the following two loci characterize












R = f1 (k) (22)
We begin by characterizing each loci in the following Lemma.
9Lemma 1.
i. The locus deﬁned by (21) satisﬁes: dk
dR > 0, lim
R→∞
k → Ω−1 (2 − π), lim
R→1
k →∞ ,a n d
k = Ω−1 (2) at R = 1
σ.
ii. The locus deﬁned by (22) satisﬁes: dk
dR < 0, lim
R→∞
k → 0, lim
R→0
k →∞ ,a n dk = ˜ k0
at R = 1
σ.
Equation (21) describes how k and R adjust to clear the bond market. When the
government is a net borrower in credit markets (R>1), the government reduces its
debt holding under higher interest rates. The lower supply of bonds frees up resources
in agents’ portfolios. In particular, entrepreneurs are able to raise their investment in
private capital formation by holding less public debt. The lower demand for government
debt clears the bond market. By comparison, in economies where the government is a net
creditor (R<1), a higher real interest rate raises the amount of transfers to the private
sector. This in turn provides entrepreneurs with more resources to allocate towards capital
investment, which in turn clears the bond market.
Analogously, the pricing condition, (22) indicates how the demand for capital by en-
trepreneurs adjusts to a change in the return on government bonds. Speciﬁcally, agents
hold more government debt and less capital when the interest on government debt is
higher. The lower amount of capital investment raises its return up to the point where
both capital and bonds yield the same rate of return. An illustration of (21) and (22) is
presented in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Equilibrium in the Benchmark Economy
Proposition 1. Suppose σ<σ 0,w h e r eσ0 : ˜ k0 = Ω−1 (2). Under this condition, a
steady-state where R>1 exists and is unique. By comparison, if σ ≥ σ0,t w oe q u i l i b r i a
exist. In one equilibrium the real return on government bonds is positive. In the other
equilibrium, the real interest rate is negative.
From our characterization of (21) and (22), both loci intersect twice at E1 and E2,a s
illustrated in the Figure above. Given that inﬂation is non-negative, the economy with a
10positive real interest rate, E2 always exists as money is dominated in rate of return and
all assets are held in non-negative quantities. However, in an economy like E1 where the
government is a net creditor, the real return to capital and bonds might fall short that
on money balances. As we demonstrate in the appendix, money is dominated in rate
of return at E1 if the inﬂation target is above some threshold level, σ0. Therefore, two
equilibria exist when σ ≥ σ0. This case is illustrated in Figure 1 above. Moreover, for all
σ<σ 0,e c o n o m yE2 only exists and is unique.
We proceed to examine the eﬀects of setting a higher inﬂation target on diﬀerent
economic outcomes in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.
i. In economies where the government is a net debtor, dk
dσ < 0, dR
dσ > 0,a n d dI
dσ > 0.
ii. In economies where the government is a net creditor, dk
dσ > 0, dR
dσ < 0,a n d dI
dσ > 0.
It can be easily veriﬁed that locus (21) shifts downwards (upwards) under a higher
inﬂation rate when R>(<)1. As illustrated in Figure 2 below, the economy with a
positive real return to bonds ends up with higher interest rates and a lower capital stock,
represented by a movement of the economy from E2 to E4.I n t u i t i v e l y ,i no r d e rt oa c h i e v e
ah i g h e ri n ﬂation target, the monetary authority needs to raise the supply of money.
This in turn generates additional seigniorage revenue to the government, which enables
it to expand its indebtedness. The higher amount of debt crowds out capital formation
in entrepreneurs’ portfolios. Moreover, by diminishing returns, the lower level of capital
investment raises its return. Finally, driven by a higher supply of government debt, the
bonds to reserves ratio is also higher from a general equilibrium perspective.
By comparison, in economies where the government is a net creditor, the additional
revenue from money creation permits the government to issue more loans to the private
sector. Consequently, capital formation increase by setting a higher inﬂation target. The
higher inﬂation rate also puts upwards pressures on nominal interest rates. This result is
illustrated as a movement of the economy from E1 to E3.
Figure 2: The Eﬀects of Targeting a Higher Inﬂation Rate
11We now turn our attention to the implications of inﬂation for economic welfare.
Inﬂation and Welfare:
For the remainder of this section, we assume that the production function is of the
Cobb-Douglas form such that: f (k)=2 1−αAkα. The parameter A reﬂects the level of
total factor productivity and α ≤ 1
2 is capital’s share of total output. Furthermore, we
focus on equilibria where the real interest rate is non-negative. That is, on the economy
that exhibits a reverse-Tobin eﬀect. The proof for the following result appears in the
appendix:
Proposition 3. Suppose σ>1. Under this condition: dud
dσ < 0, due
dσ ≥ 0,a n d
dW
dσ < 0,w h e r eW = ud + ue.
Interestingly, unlike previous work such as Schreft and Smith (1997), inﬂation has
distributional eﬀects in the economy. While setting a higher inﬂation target raises the
welfare of entrepreneurs, it has adverse consequences on the welfare of depositors. The
cumulative eﬀect of inﬂation on total welfare is negative.
As discussed in Proposition 1, targeting a higher inﬂation rate hinders capital forma-
tion and total output. The lower amount of output reduces the demand for labor exerting
downwards pressures on wages and savings of all agents in the economy. However, driven
by a higher return to capital and government debt, the total income generated by a typical
entrepreneur is higher. Therefore, total consumption and welfare of entrepreneurs are also
higher under a higher inﬂation target. By comparison, a less restrictive inﬂation target
reduces the value of money and the amount of insurance received by depositors. Com-
bined with lower income, the expected utility of a typical depositor is adversely aﬀected
by inﬂation. As we demonstrate in the appendix, total welfare is lower under a higher
inﬂation rate.
Although our analytical result focuses on cases where σ>1, numerical work indicates
that the result above holds for all σ>0. Consequently, type-speciﬁc optimal policies
diﬀer signiﬁcantly. While an inﬂationary environment is preferred on welfare grounds
for entrepreneurs, depositors’ welfare is maximized at the Friedman rule rate of money
creation. Finally, the inﬂation target that maximizes social welfare is the one that achieves
the Friedman rule. When money and government debt yield the same rate of return, all
agents in the economy receive the same level of consumption ex-ante. Moreover, depositors
are completely insured against random relocation shocks. Notably, the Friedman rule
may or may not be deﬂationary. In the example illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 below,
t h eF r i e d m a nr u l ei sa c h i e v e da ta ni n ﬂation target slightly above zero, σ =1 .0001.T h e









































Figure 4. Inﬂation and Total Welfare
It is important to note that the optimality of the Friedman rule in this economy
depends on the weight allocated to each group of agents. In our setting, the expected
utility of depositors and entrepreneurs is weighted by the size of each group, which is equal
by assumption. Interestingly, the Friedman rule will no longer be optimal if policymakers
put a slightly higher weight on the welfare of entrepreneurs.14 For example, suppose total
welfare is such that: W = ρud +( 1− ρ)ue,w h e r eρ ∈ (0,1) is the weight associated to
the welfare of depositors.15 Using the same example above, if ρ = .4, the Friedman rule
is no longer the optimal policy. Numerical work indicates that the optimal inﬂation rate
is 10%.
14Edmond (2002) studies optimal monetary policy in a two-period overlapping generations economy.
In his economy, people are born with diﬀerent endowment levels during their young and old age, which
they invest in cash and government bonds. Such endowment diﬀerences render agents to become either
lenders or borrowers. Although some agents with low young age income want to borrow to smooth their
consumption levels, they are unable to due to market incompleteness. In this environment, borrowers
gain from higher inﬂation due to higher transfers received from the government. By comparison, lenders’
welfare is adversely aﬀected from inﬂation because they face a lower return on their savings and contribute
more to total transfers. Under certain conditions, the author demonstrates that the Friedman rule might
not be optimal.
15The environment can be slightly changed by assuming a total population size equal to one. Moreover,
ρ can reﬂect the fraction of agents that are depositors. Such changes should generate similar insights.
13Finally, it is easily veriﬁed that the expected income of entrepreneurs relative to depos-
itors can be expressed as:
£π
I +1− π
¤−1. Given that nominal interest rates are increasing
with the inﬂation rate, income inequality rises with inﬂation. This is driven by the inabil-
ity of depositors to completely hedge against inﬂa t i o nw h e nm o n e yi sd o m i n a t e di nr a t e
of return. Ex-post, entrepreneurs and non-relocated agents receive higher consumption
under a higher inﬂation tax. By comparison the consumption of relocated agents is sig-
niﬁcantly adversely aﬀected. In this manner, our results in the benchmark economy are
consistent with recent empirical evidence that ﬁnd a positive correlation between inﬂation
and income inequality across countries. For instance, in a sample of 76 countries, Romer
and Romer (1998) ﬁnd that income inequality deteriorates at high levels of inﬂation.16
3 The Economy with a Stock Market
We proceed to study the linkages between ﬁnancial development, economic development,
and monetary policy. Unlike the benchmark economy, we permit the formation of sec-
ondary markets that permit specialized and irreversible capital goods to be traded between
diﬀerent generations of entrepreneurs.17,18 In particular, we assume that old entrepreneurs
are capable of forming coalitions that intermediate trading between old sellers and young
buyers. As intermediaries act on behalf of sellers, they are capable of exerting their mar-
ket power by extracting all surplus from buyers and charging them the monopoly price.
Therefore, the price of a unit of capital is equal to one unit of goods.
Given that only entrepreneurs participate in the market for physical capital, the stock
market only aﬀects their portfolio choice. Therefore, we only study their choices. Depos-
itors’ problem carries on from the previous section. We begin with the set of constraints
facing a typical entrepreneur.
At the beginning of period t, an entrepreneur works and earns the market wage,
wt. In contrast to the benchmark economy, a young entrepreneur allocates her savings
between the purchases of government debt, new capital investment, and the purchase of
undepreciated capital goods from an old entrepreneur:
wt = be
t + it +( 1− δ)kt (23)
As old agents are able to sell their capital in equity markets, their old-age income includes
the value of undepreciated capital, (1 − δ)kt+1:
ce
t+1 = f(kt+1,l t+1) − wt+1lt+1 + Rtbe
t +( 1− δ)kt+1 (24)
Therefore, the evolution of a particular type of capital between periods t and t +1is
expressed by:
kt+1 = it +( 1− δ)kt (25)
A typical entrepreneur maximizes her lifetime utility (26) subject to (23)-(25) :
16Easterly and Fischer (2001) and Albanesi (2007) reach similar conclusions.
17Studying a non-monetary economy, Greenwood and Smith (1997) highlight the intra-generational
liquidity role of the stock market. In contrast, we study the role of the stock market as a mechanism that
generates liquidity across generations.
18Bencivenga, Smith, and Starr (1995) consider the stock market as a mechanism that permits the
transfer of capital in progress over time. In their setting, capital goods are homogeneous and depreciate
completely in the production process. However, there are diﬀerent investment technologies that convert
the consumption good into physical capital. The technologies diﬀer by their gestation period. In this
manner, the stock market provides intergenerational liquidity by allowing agents to trade claims to capital





The young individual will invest in both capital and government bonds if they yield the
same rate of return:
Rt = f1(kt+1,l t+1)+1− δ (27)
As in the previous section, capital and bonds are perfect substitutes. Therefore, they are
held in equilibrium up to the point where they both yield the same rate of return at the
margin. However, in contrast to the benchmark economy, the marginal return from a unit
of capital also includes the resale value of a unit of capital, (1 − δ).C o n s e q u e n t l y ,f o ra
given level of investment, it is clear from (27),that the stock market raises the return to
capital.
3.1 General Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the law of motion of capital is the same as the benchmark economy:
kt+1 =[ 2− (1 + μt)π]wt (28)
In addition, the no-arbitrage condition, (27), along with the government’s budget con-
straint (1),a n dt h ed e ﬁnition of the debt to reserves policy tool, yield the evolution of










Conditions (28) and (29) characterize the economy’s equilibrium conditions at each
point in time.
3.1.1 Steady-State Analysis
Imposing steady-state on (28) and (29), the following two loci characterize the long-run












f1 (k)+1− δ = R (31)
Obviously, if δ =1 , (31) corresponds to the no-arbitrage condition for the benchmark
economy, (22). The behavior of of each loci is qualitatively identical to those in the
benchmark economy. The following Proposition establishes existence and uniqueness in
the stock market economy:
Proposition 4. Suppose σ<σ 1,w h e r eσ1 : ˜ k1 = Ω−1 (2) and ˜ k1 : f1 (k)+1−δ = 1
σ.
Under this condition, a steady-state where R>1 exists and is unique. By comparison, if
σ ≥ σ1, two equilibria exist.
To begin, we discuss the impact of ﬁn a n c i a ld e v e l o p m e n ti nt h ec a s eo fu n i q u es t e a d y -
states. In order to gain insight into the impact of the stock market, please refer to Figure
155. Since the market for capital raises its return, the no-arbitrage curve in the stock market
economy lies above that in the benchmark economy.
As observed in the Figure, the economy with an active stock market, ES
2 ,h a sah i g h e r
real return to capital and a higher level of investment in private capital compared to
economy EB
2 , where a stock market is absent. Consequently, total income and welfare of
entrepreneurs is higher when capital is traded across generations. Furthermore, for a ﬁxed
inﬂation tax rate, the nominal interest rate will be higher if a market for capital exists.
Although depositors receive a lower amount of insurance against idiosyncratic risk, their
welfare is also driven higher by higher wages. Therefore, ﬁnancial development leads to a
Pareto superior outcome.
Interestingly, the gains from ﬁnancial development are not symmetric across diﬀerent
groups of agents. Given that entrepreneurs do not participate in money markets, their
expected income rises faster than that of depositors.19 Therefore, as in Greenwood and
Jovanovic (1990), income inequality rises with the stages of ﬁnancial development.20
In addition, by no-arbitrage between physical capital and public debt, the real return
to government bonds will be higher if a stock market exists. Consequently, in an economy
with an active secondary market for capital, the debt to reserves ratio must be lower. This
implies that it takes a less restrictive monetary policy to achieve a particular inﬂation
target when the ﬁnancial system is more advanced. Moreover, entrepreneurs devote fewer
resources towards unproductive assets such as government debt in economies with better
developed ﬁnancial systems.21
Figure 5. The Eﬀects of Financial Development at Low Inﬂation Targets
19Ex-post, the income of entrepreneurs and non-movers rises faster compared to that of relocated agents.
20Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) study a non-monetary endogenous growth economy where agents
diﬀer by their initial capital endowments. In their setting, agents can invest in a low yield riskless
project or a risky high yielding projects. Although ﬁnancial intermediation is capable of diversifying
risk, it is costly to participate in. Therefore, ﬁnancial intermediation only arises when growth is high
enough. However, no all agents can aﬀord to participate. At a particular point in time, only wealthy
agents intermediate their savings. Consequently, rich agents enjoy higher saving rates and income growth
compared to poor individuals.
In our setting, agents have the same level of endowment. However, income inequality arises because
money is dominated in rate of return. Financial development contributes to income dispersion among
diﬀerent groups of agents.
21In contrast, Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) show that ﬁnancial development will lead to a net
increase in payment obligations of the government.
16Given that the stock market raises the real interest on government bonds for any level
of investment, multiple steady-states are more likely to occur in the presence of the stock
market. That is, the parameter space under which an economy with negative real interest
rates also exists is much larger when capital is traded between generations. Therefore, if
the inﬂation target is suﬃciently high, the impact of ﬁnancial development on diﬀerent
outcomes may become indeterminate as illustrated in Figure 6. In this example, the
steady-sate is unique in the benchmark economy. However, we have two equilibria in
t h ep r e s e n c eo fe q u i t ym a r k e t s .C o n s e q u e n t l y ,i nt h ep r e s e n c eo fas e c o n d a r ym a r k e tf o r
capital, the capital stock might slightly increase as in the case of a unique steady-state
(movement from EB
2 to ES
2 )o ri tm i g h ti n c r e a s es i g n i ﬁcantly (movement from EB
2 to ES
1 )
exerting downward pressures on real interest rates. We state this result in the following
Lemma.22
Lemma 2. In either the benchmark or the stock market economies, multiple steady-
states may exist if the inﬂation target is suﬃciently high. However, the required lower
bound for the target is higher in the benchmark economy. That is, σ1 <σ 0.
Figure 6. The Eﬀects of Financial Development at Intermediate Inﬂation Targets
Financial Market Development and the Eﬀects of Monetary Policy
We next discuss the interactions between monetary policy and ﬁnancial development.
We focus primarily on the case where there is a unique steady-state in the benchmark
economy and the economy with a stock market. We begin with the following result:
22Minier (2003) empirically examines the links between stock market activity and economic growth. In
particular, she ﬁnds that the eﬀect of the stock market depends on the stage of development. In countries
with a high degree of market capitalization, ﬁnancial development is growth-enhancing. However, in
countries with small stock markets, increased capitalization is associated with lower growth. In our model,
we demonstrate that the gains from ﬁnancial development may be indeterminate if the depreciation rate
is not too high. In the event of multiple steady-states, the net impact of ﬁnancial development depends
on the size of the public sector – if the government has a large budget deﬁcit, introducing a stock market
will have a relatively small eﬀect on the level of economic development.
17Proposition 5. The eﬀects of inﬂation on capital formation are much stronger when
capital is traded across generations. Consequently, the gains from ﬁnancial development
are eroded at high inﬂation rates.
With the exception of the welfare of entrepreneurs, it is easily veriﬁed that the quali-
tative eﬀects of inﬂa t i o no nd i ﬀerent economic outcomes are analogous to those obtained
in the benchmark economy. However, as we demonstrate below, inﬂation has a bigger
impact on capital formation in the presence of the stock market.
To draw more insights into the linkages between economic development, ﬁnancial de-
velopment and inﬂation, we construct the following example which we illustrate in Figure
7 below. The following parameters are used along with a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion described above: A =1 , α = .33,a n dπ = .5.M o r e o v e r ,δ = .9 for the stock market
economy compared to δ =1for our benchmark case. The y-axis represents the elasticity
of the capital stock with respect to inﬂation. The gross inﬂation rate is on the horizontal
axis.
The results provide three diﬀerent observations. First, the relationship between inﬂa-
tion and capital accumulation is convex in both types of economies. That is, the adverse
impact of inﬂation on the capital stock is stronger at lower inﬂation rates. Second, in-
ﬂation has a bigger impact in the stock market economy as discussed above. Again, this
demonstrates that monetary policy has a stronger eﬀect in economies at higher stages of
ﬁnancial development. Finally, the eﬀects of ﬁnancial development on capital formation


















Figure 7: Financial Development and Monetary Policy
Why is the relationship between inﬂation and the capital stock (or output) convex?
Furthermore, why are the eﬀects of monetary policy stronger at higher stages of ﬁnancial
and economic development? The answer to both questions lies in the market for govern-
ment bonds. From a general equilibrium perspective, the supply of government debt as
a fraction of wages, bs
w ≡ β











D =2− π − Ω(k) (33)
Therefore, (32) and (33) provide a solution for k and β. Both loci indicate how the capital
market has to adjust to conditions in the market for public debt. Clearly, the supply of
bonds is strictly increasing in k (or decreasing in R), while the demand for bonds is
inversely related to the amount of capital in the economy.
As discussed in the previous section, inﬂation aﬀects the economy through the gov-












which indicates that the capital stock must decline to absorb the additional debt that
comes about with a higher tax on money. However, it is clear that the capital stock needs
to adjust by less as inﬂation increases. Intuitively, the ability of the government to collect
seigniorage revenue declines with the level of inﬂation. Consequently, for a given change
in the inﬂation rate, the capital stock needs to adjust less when inﬂation is initially high
to clear the bond market.
Furthermore, for a given inﬂation target, it is clear from (34) that the capital stock
needs to adjust signiﬁcantly more when the ﬁnancial system is more developed. This is
occurs because capital investment is higher in the presence of the stock market. There-
fore, f11 is smaller in absolute terms. Moreover, the government is able to supply less
government debt as a fraction of deposits when a secondary market for capital exists as it
drives nominal interest rates higher. This in turn renders the capital stock more sensitive
to changes in the stock of government bonds and inﬂation.
Interestingly, in contrast to our benchmark economy, entrepreneurs are more exposed
to inﬂation when capital is traded across generations. From (24) and (27), the steady-
state consumption of entrepreneurs is expressed by: ce =( f1 (k)+1− δ)w(k).T h e
eﬀects of inﬂation on rental income are qualitatively the same as the economy without a
stock market. Higher inﬂation rates fuel government debt to the beneﬁt of entrepreneurs.
However, in the presence of a market for capital, the income from capital also comes
from the ability to sell it to future generations. Since the crowding-out eﬀect leads to
lower wage income from the current young, savings will be lower and the ability of future
generations to purchase capital is compromised. Therefore, as we demonstrate in the
appendix, the eﬀects of inﬂation on the welfare of entrepreneurs is non-monotonic in a
ﬁnancially developed economy. The following Proposition summarizes this result:
Proposition 6. Suppose δ< α
1−α. Also, let σ>1. Under this condition, due
dσ ≤ (>)0
if σ ≤ (>)ˆ σ.B yc o m p a r i s o ni fδ ≥ α
1−α, due
dσ > 0.
When the capital stock is more durable, entrepreneurs would obtain more income from
selling their capital (after depreciation) to the next generation. However, once inﬂation
reaches a particular threshold, the crowding-out eﬀect becomes quite strong. In fact,
capital accumulation reaches levels that are so distorted it is almost as if a secondary
market for capital does not even exist. That is, the disortionary eﬀects of inﬂation can
reach a point that they outreach the gains from ﬁnancial development.
Consequently, at a certain rate, the eﬀects of inﬂation become qualitatively the same
as the benchmark economy. Then, the welfare calculation is very similar. However, the
marginal eﬀects of inﬂation on the capital stock do weaken as inﬂation increases.
19Thus, entrepreneurs locally prefer the Friedman in a more advanced ﬁnancial system.
That is, slight deviations from the Friedman Rule lower the welfare of entrepreneurs. Nev-
ertheless, inﬂation is not globally optimal from the perspective of entrepreneurs. Eventu-
ally, inﬂation becomes high enough that the gains from rental income strongly dominate
the losses from the re-sale value on the secondary market. Finally, although inﬂation has
non-monotonic eﬀects on the welfare of entrepreneurs, the welfare of depositors is strictly
decreasing with the level of inﬂation.
Proposition 6 requires that there is positive net money creation. An example that
also considers negative net money creation is illustrated in Figures 8 and 9 below. The
parameters used to construct this example are identical to those used in the previous



































Figure 9. Inﬂation and Depositors’ Welfare
It could also be shown that the welfare of an entrepreneur would exceed the Friedman
Rule money growth rate once the inﬂation rate is suﬃciently high.
We turn to our ﬁnal question: Does optimal monetary policy depend on an economy’s
stage of ﬁnancial development? The answer is yes. First, consider the case of an equally
weighted social welfare function as initially introduced in the benchmark economy. In that
setting, the Friedman Rule is still optimal. Given that the real return to capital is higher
in the presence of a secondary market for capital, the rate of money creation (contraction)
that achieves the Friedman rule is much smaller when capital is traded across generations.
Therefore, optimal monetary policy should be more restrictive when the ﬁnancial system
is more developed.
However, optimal policy is still more restrictive even if the Friedman Rule is not
optimal. Suppose that the monetary authority caters more towards capital owners. In the
example considered in the benchmark economy, the weight associated to entrepreneurs’
welfare is 0.6. In the benchmark economy, the optimal inﬂation target is 10%. Using
the same parameters, along with δ = .95,i ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tt h eo p t i m a li n ﬂation
target in the stock market economy is 8.6%. Even though policy is tilted towards the
interests of entrepreneurs, it still takes workers into account. And, workers beneﬁtf r o m
higher levels of the capital stock. As inﬂation has a larger impact on investment in a
ﬁnancially developed economy, the optimal inﬂation target is also lower. Consequently,
our work clearly suggests that optimal policy depends on a country’s level of economic
development.
204 Conclusions
Do the distributional consequences of monetary policy depend on the extent of ﬁnancial
development? Should optimal monetary policy vary across countries? In order to answer
these questions, we develop a monetary growth production model with heterogeneous
agents. In our economy, optimal policy needs to weigh the eﬀects of policy across two
groups — capital owners and individuals who hold liquid assets. While banks help limit
the exposure to inﬂation, there are limits because money alleviates the frictions of private
information and limited communication. In this environment, we compare two economies
that are identical in every aspect except for their level of ﬁnancial development. In a
country with limited ﬁnancial development, a stock market is absent. In the other, an
equity market is active. In either economy, inﬂation adversely aﬀects capital formation
and output. Individuals who hold liquid assets are always adversely aﬀected by inﬂation,
but the attitude of capital owners. depends on the level of ﬁnancial development. In
particular, in the presence of a stock market, the impact of inﬂa t i o no nt h ew e l f a r eo f
capital owners is non-monotonic. Nevertheless, optimal monetary policy is always more
conservative at higher levels of ﬁnancial development
215A p p e n d i x
1. P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . We begin by demonstrating that entrepreneurs’ welfare
is increasing with inﬂation. Imposing a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form
described in the text on the welfare function of entrepreneurs, (9),w eg e t :
ue =l nRw =l n2 1−2αA2α(1 − α)k2α−1 (35)
Given that dk
dσ < 0, due
dσ ≥ 0 for all α ≤ 1
2.
From (16) and some algebra, the steady-state expected utility of a depositor is:
ud =l nw − π lnσ +( 1− π)lnR(k)
































































dσ < 0 if:
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We proceed to derive an expression for σ
k
dk
dσ.F r o m(21) and (22), and under a Cobb-
Douglas production function, the steady-state capital stock is the solution to the following
polynomial:
2α






f1 (k) − 1
¶
π =2 (40)















¢´ < 0 (41)
























We next substitute (42) into (39) to get the following condition: dud
dσ < 0 if:


















R ≤ 0 for α ≤ 1
2. This indicates that the inequality always
holds for an equilibrium where 1 >R> 1
σ and therefore dud
dσ < 0. By comparison, suppose
R>1 > 1
σ. Using the equilibrium condition,(40) into (43), dud









which always holds under the conditions above. This completest the proof that the welfare
of depositors is decreasing with the inﬂation rate when R ≥ 1
σ, α ≤ 1
2,a n dσ>1
2.
Finally, we show that total welfare, W, is also lower under a higher inﬂation rate. By
deﬁnition, W = ud + ue.U s i n g(9) and (16) :
W =2l nw − πlnσ +( 2− π)lnR (44)






















Using the information derived above, dW
dσ < 0 if:













Clearly, for all 1
σ <R<1, the above always holds as under the case for depositors.





σ [1 − 2α]
¤
which always holds as 2α
[1− 1
σ[1−2α]] < 1 for σ>1 and α<1
2. This completes the proof of
Proposition 3.
2. P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .From the result in Proposition 1, a unique steady-state exists
in the benchmark economy if σ<σ 0,w h e r eσ0 : ˜ k0 = Ω−1 (2).A si n d i c a t e di nL e m m a
1, ˜ k0 is such that f1 (k)= 1
σ. Therefore, ˜ k0 is strictly increasing in σ. In the presence
of the stock market, uniqueness of stationary equilibrium occurs when σ<σ 1,w h e r e
σ1 : ˜ k1 = Ω−1 (2) and ˜ k1 solves f1 (k)+1− δ = 1
σ,w i t hd˜ k1
dσ > 0. In this manner, it is
obvious that ˜ k1 > ˜ k0 for any given σ.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,σ1 <σ 0. Therefore, the parameter
space under which multiple steady-states occur is much larger when capital is traded
across generations. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
3. Proof of Proposition 6. As discussed in the text, the consumption of an entrepre-
neurs in the presence of a stock market is: ce =( f1 (k)+1− δ)w(k).B yd i ﬀerentiating












(2α − 1)21−αAαk2α−2 + α(1 − δ)kα−1
ce
23With some simplifying algebra, due
dk ≤ 0 if:
k1−α ≤
(1 − 2α)2 1−αA
(1 − δ)
Therefore, when a reverse Tobin eﬀect is present, due
dσ > 0 if the condition above holds
Equivalently using the fact that: R =2 1−αAαkα−1 +1− δ. The condition above can
be written as:










The result in Proposition 6 directly follows. This completes the proof of Proposition 6.
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